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In this paper I address Jerome Stolnitz’s famous article “On the cogni-
tive triviality of art,” with the aim of defending aesthetic and literary 
cognitivism against the charges Stolnitz issues at it therein. My defence 
of literary cognitivism is grounded in contemporary epistemology, which, 
I argue, is more embracive of cognitive values of literature tradition-
ally invoked by literary cognitivists. My discussion is structured against 
Stolnitz’s individual arguments, dedicated in particular to the problem 
of literary truth. After exploring what such notion might amount to, I 
move on to address the problems of applicability and triviality of liter-
ary truths, and I end by defending literature as a cognitively valuable 
social practice.
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1. Preliminary remarks: literature’s cognitive dimension
Back in 1992 Jerome Stolnitz published “On the cognitive triviality 
of art,” a paper which to this day remains one of the most famous and 
infl uential sources of arguments against aesthetic cognitivism (AC): a 
view that art is cognitively valuable. In conclusion, Stolnitz wrote: 
In either case, there is no method of arriving at [the truth] in art and no 
confi rmation or possibility of confi rmation in art. Artistic truths, like the 
works of art that give rise to them, are discretely unrelated and therefore 
form no corpus either of belief or knowledge. Hence formal contradictions 
are tolerated effortlessly, if they are ever remarked. Only rarely does an 
artistic truth point to a genuine advance in knowledge. Artistic truths are, 
preponderantly, distinctly banal. Compared to science, above all, but also 
to history, religion, and garden variety knowing, artistic truth is a sport, 
stunted, hardly to be compared. (342)1
1 All quotes are from Stolnitz (2004).
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In this paper, I analyse Stolnitz’s anti-cognitivist arguments from the 
perspective of contemporary epistemology. I argue that his criticism of 
art’s cognitive value rests on an oversimplifi ed view of what constitutes 
such value: as evident from the quote, Stolnitz grounds it on the notion 
of artistic truth and sets up his paper as a list of diffi culties involved 
in fi nding such truth. I believe his arguments can be met, which is 
what I am mostly concerned with here. However, my paper is indirectly 
intended as a contribution to the contemporary aesthetic and literary 
cognitivism, and therefore, its scope is greater than Stolnitz’s. I presup-
pose that art’s cognitive value is grounded not solely in its capacity to 
deliver truths, but in its capacity to sustain and animate many of our 
cognitive processes, such as thinking, refl ecting, scrutinizing, under-
standing, developing opinions and exercising judgments.2
Given Stolnitz’s focus, I concentrate my discussion on literature, 
with the aim of epistemologically providing a defence of its epistemic 
reliability. Following many who have provided accounts of literature’s 
cognitive value, I see it as a repository of human experience, as an 
archive of humanly important stories which tell us something about 
the big wide world, other people, and ourselves.3 Literature’s cognitive 
value stems from the fact that it feeds directly into our intellectual 
demands: it tells us about things we care about as refl ective human 
beings, as social agents, as participants in public life, as individuals 
who struggle to cope with whatever the world brings on them. In light 
of its doing so, literature demands a particular kind of engagement, 
one which asks us to exercise our refl ective, emotional, imaginative 
and perceptive capacities.4 Stolnitz however does not share such a con-
ception of literature. As one of the most famous 20th century advoca-
tor of disinterestedness as the key aesthetic attitude, Stolnitz defends 
art’s value on the basis of its formal features, rather than on the basis 
of its representational or expressive dimension. His account of art’s 
cognitive triviality rests on a comparison between art and other prac-
tices considered cognitively valuable, namely science, history and reli-
gion.5 Indirectly, he presupposes epistemic monism, a view according 
2 Insightful discussions over what is at stake in debate about literature’s (and 
art’s) cognitive value are found in Davies (2007), Gaut (2005, 2006), Gibson (2007), 
Graham (1996), Lamarque (2007).
3 See in particular Nussbaum (1990) and Gibson (2007).
4 In insisting on literature’s capacity to reveal aspects of the world to us, I am not 
implying that it should not be attended in a way which reveals its literary value—
literary stance is, on my view, compatible with an epistemological approach to it, in a 
manner defended by M. Rowe (2010) in his criticism of Lamarque and Olsen’s (1994) 
view. Though here I can’t specify my claim, I do not think of my approach as an 
instance of instrumentalization of literature, as some scholars (e.g. Derek Attridge 
(2015)) do.
5 Though some of his statements regarding science’s veritistic deliverances are 
controversial, I will not challenge him on that basis. Rather, I will go step by step 
through his claims and show that contemporary literary cognitivism, aided by most 
recent developments in epistemology, can successfully fi ght off his arguments.
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to which truth is the only epistemic good. My approach is different. 
Notwithstanding literature’s artistic value, our engagements with lit-
erature, I argue, invite epistemological assessment. We form beliefs 
on the bases of what we read, we make judgments, particularly moral, 
about what we read, we think differently about concepts we consid-
ered familiar prior to reading and we feel complex emotions for fi ctional 
characters. Therefore, we have to explore epistemic aspects of literary 
engagements, and, more importantly, explain why these aspects are 
more complex than presupposed by Stolnitz’s monistic paradigm.6
An expanded view of literature’s cognitive value is supported by the 
recent developments in epistemology, particularly by the ‘epistemic 
pluralism’.7 The main aspect of pluralism is its expansion from truth 
to various other states (such has acknowledgement and understand-
ing) and processes (such as weighting evidence, formulating hypoth-
eses, refl ecting on possibilities etc.) that are recognized as cognitively 
valuable. Since the time of Aristotle, literature has been credited with 
giving rise to such states and processes—usually referred to as indirect 
benefi ts—and now fi nally epistemology can ground its capacity for do-
ing so. By indirect benefi ts, I assume various ways in which we come 
to think about the world as the result of our experience with the liter-
ary work. Literature can deepen our understanding of phenomena it 
brings to view by showing us some of their aspects we might have been 
unaware off. It can make us adopt a different perspective on things by 
showing us nuances we did not recognize as relevant. It can provide 
opportunities to refl ect on our experience, principles we endorse, at-
titudes we hold, values and virtues we cherish and the like. By offering 
vivid and usually rather detailed descriptions of experiences of fi ctional 
characters, it can bring to view experiences that we didn’t have oppor-
tunities to undergo fi rsthand. Literature can infl uence our imagination 
and make us better at counterfactual thinking and moral reasoning.8 
While Stolnitz might have a point in showing how hard (though not 
impossible!) it is to talk of truth in the context of literature, he is wrong 
in denying literature its cognitive value. With the right epistemology in 
place, his arguments lose their sharpness.
From the standpoint of epistemology, the most promising explana-
tion of the mechanism that enables such cognitive transfers is, on my 
6 It is important to stress my epistemological approach, in order not to lose 
sight of my focus here. For the most part, literary cognitivists aim at exploring 
the relationship between literature’s cognitive value and its overall value. Against 
that background, one can challenge literature’s cognitive value by denying (i) that 
literature is cognitively valuable, (ii) that its cognitive dimension matters for or 
determines its aesthetic value or (iii) both. My approach however is narrower, in 
that I respond only to (i). I aim to show that literature is cognitively valuable, not in 
a trivial sense in which it might occasionally contain true propositions, but in light 
of its deliberate dedication to exploring issues that humans care about.
7 See David (2001) for epistemic monism and Riggs (2002, 2008) and Kvanving 
(2005) for pluralism.
8 For the latest research on this issue see Young’s contribution to this volume.
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view, testimony. A literary work can be seen as a special kind of tes-
timony in which an author assumes the role of an informant and the 
reader that of a listener.9 As in any testimonial exchange, in order for 
a listener to learn something, the informer has to be sincere and reli-
able, and a listener should not trust blindly but on the basis of evidence 
that supports the testimony (even if such evidence consists of the prior 
reliability of a particular informer). While literature, as creative and 
imaginative writing, seems to stand opposite to a truthful and reliable 
account of events, I will show that in many cases, there are no reasons 
to exclude literary authors from domain of trustworthy informers. In 
addition, infl uenced by Jennifer Lackey’s account of testimony (Lackey 
2008), I claim that we learn from what others are telling us, not from 
what they believe. Therefore, the fact that literary fi ction invites the 
attitude of make-believe rather than believe does not render it unre-
liable. However, to properly see it as a source of cognitive gains, the 
narrow view of testimony should be extended: testimony should not be 
confi ned to transmission of propositions that the informer believes to 
be true, and sought-after by the audience.10 Rather, testimony is more 
embracive of other sorts of verbal (and written) exchanges among hu-
mans and it has no restrictions on the subject matter or the form in 
which it is given.11 Such instances of testimony can result in indirect 
cognitive gains as described above, provided a listener is willing to en-
gage with the content of informer’s claims and evaluate them from the 
perspective of her set of beliefs, her experience and tacit knowledge of 
the world and empirically developed capacity to discriminate good and 
bad informants.
With these preliminary remarks we can turn to Stolnitz.
2. Literary truths 
Stolnitz begins his criticism of the cognitive value of art by attacking 
the notion of artistic method and artistic truth. “We have a relatively 
clear and fi rm conception of how science arrives at its truths”, he says, 
“but a ‘method of artistic truth’ is not matter for debate and hardly 
makes sense...” In addition, “scientifi c truths, once arrived at, are 
truths about the great world”, but it is altogether unclear whether “the 
arts give us truths about the great world” (337).
As a way of response to these statements, two things should be 
noted. First, many literary authors report conducting a fare amount 
of research prior to writing their works. Although on Stolnitz’s view, 
a literary work “has no reference beyond itself” (337), authors and the 
audience alike have often spoken of literature being about the world. 
9 I develop this analogy in Vidmar (2012b), in Vidmar (2013) and in Prijić and 
Vidmar (2012). I refer to it as a fi ctional testimony.
10 For a discussion, see Lackey (2008).
11 I rely on Jennifer Lackey’s characterization of the broad view of testimony (see 
Lackey 2008). See also Millar (2010).
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Gregg Crane is but one literary scholar who emphasizes the extent to 
which authors of realistic novels are committed to truthful representa-
tions. These writers, he explains, “share a general conception of fi ction 
as a detailed and accurate representation of historically specifi c char-
acters and settings—their manners, ways of dress, speech patterns, 
social habits, main concerns, and topics of conversation” (Crane 2007: 
156). On Crane’s view, literary realism is “empiricist in orientation”, 
grounded upon “concrete examples”, focused on an “exploration of the 
here and now”, on the “world of concrete personal experiences”, “in-
ductive rather than deductive, experimental and open to uncertainty” 
(Crane 2007: 157–8). Given such a tradition of investigating the issues 
one writes about, where such investigations often take the form similar 
to empirical scientifi c investigation, it makes sense to think of literary 
authors as testifi ers: through their work, they are telling us what they 
see in the world, and how they see it. The ‘method of artistic truth’ is 
not all that different from other methods we rely upon to gain knowl-
edge, and from other means through which knowledge is conveyed to 
us. Naturally, the crucial difference is the fact that, unlike in regu-
lar cases of testimony, authors are not under the obligation to tell the 
truth. However, at least with respect to those who commit themselves 
to realism, we should not presume they are feeding us with falsities.12 
As I mentioned in the introductory part, readers, as receivers of au-
thors’ testimony share the burden of carefully assessing whether what 
they are told is likely to be true or not. They can do this in light of their 
familiarity with literary practice and with their overall experience of 
the world. Against such a background, they can differentiate between 
novels which offer reliable accounts of their subject/theme nexus and 
those that do not. Even a glimpse of a novel by Theodore Dreiser or 
Henry James, in comparison to a novel by Danielle Steel, reveals strik-
ing differences in how these authors approach their topic and represent 
their subject. For an audience who has the capacity to discriminate 
good testimony from bad, the later work will not be considered a valu-
able source (though it can be an enjoyable read).
Moreover, it is not quite so that ‘literary truth’ is not subject to criti-
cal evaluation and occasional refutation, primarily by literary critics. 
Works which aim to be ‘true to the world’ but fail, are criticized on 
the account of their epistemic unreliability. One way at least where 
such practice is obvious relates to the low art vs. high art distinction. 
Trashed for its lack of psychological reality in characters’ presentation, 
for its highly simplifi ed accounts of political, social and other forces 
operative in society and for overall ignorance of the complexities of ‘hu-
man predicament’, low art novels do not collect praise for their cogni-
tive impact and are often castigated for the perspective they offer.
12 Elsewhere I offered an account of how non-realistic literary works satisfy the 
condition of reliability, see Vidmar (2012a).
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That leaves us with the problem of explaining the notion of ‘literary 
truth’. Some have tried to do so by claiming that literary truth is a sort 
of a sui generis kind. Inviting severe criticism from Peter Lamarque, 
Iris Murdoch talks about “artist’s just and compassionate vision of the 
world” which reveals “the real quality of human nature” (taken from 
Lamarque, 1996, 97). As Lamarque pointed out, this line of defence is 
not promising since it only obliges a defender of literary cognitivism to 
provide an account of this special kind of truth and then to clarify how 
it relates to our cognitive pursuits. As explained in my preliminary 
remarks, on the view I am defending, literature is a source of truth 
about the great world and its complexities and it can reveal ‘qualities of 
human nature’, but if by ‘real’ Murdoch has in mind some kind of meta-
physical properties that are only discoverable through art, then I share 
Lamarque’s worries. To the extent that literature is concerned with 
the real world, the truths it delivers are truths about that very world. 
Stolnitz disagrees, claiming that we lack a criterion on how to rec-
ognize an artistic (literary) truth, whereas we do not lack such criterion 
in other domains. Even if it might be objected that religious beliefs “are 
indisputably true of the great world” (338), the fact remains that state-
ments like ‘Man is the creature of God’ is a “recognizably religious truth” 
(338). The problem, he claims, with literary truth is that it is altogether 
unclear what such truth would look like or what it would amount to.
I do not think this is a serious problem for literary cognitivism. In 
one, rather trivial sense, literary truths are those truths that are ob-
tained from literature. Given that there are no limits to the topics that 
literature deals with, there are no boundaries to the kinds of truth we 
can fi nd in literature.13 But this speaks in favour of the cognitive value 
of literature, rather than against it, since it reveals how rich a source 
of truth literature is. Literature is concerned with all kinds of truths 
pertaining to all kinds of domains, without restriction. Even the most 
random survey of works from different historical periods or literary 
genres reveals that there’s no restriction on themes in literature. Lit-
erature concerns itself with all aspects and domains of being human. 
Consequently, all sorts of truths can be found in literature: historical, 
biological, sociological, philosophical, anthropological etc.14 The notion 
of literary truth can only refer to literature as a source, not to a special 
kind of truth distinctive of literature.
13 Notice the analogy with the things we learn from the newspaper, developed by 
Noel Carroll (2007). Although we learn all sorts of things from newspapers, we do 
not have a clear conception of newspaper truth, nor do we need one in order to take 
newspapers as reliable.
14 Stolnitz himself acknowledges this: “It now falls out why there was, when we 
began, no trouble in fi nding clear cases of scientifi c, historical, religious, and garden 
variety truths, whereas no clear examples of artistic truth came to mind. None of its 
truths are peculiar to art. All are proper to some extra-artistic sphere of the great 
world.” (341). Well, that is precisely what I want my epistemological analysis to 
reveal.
 I. Vidmar, Literature and Truth: Revisiting Stolnitz’s Anti-cognitivism 357
Committed to fi nding an artistic truth, Stolnitz turns to Pride and 
Prejudice and comes up with one potential candidate: ‘Stubborn pride 
and ignorant prejudice keep apart two attractive people living in Hert-
fordshire in Regency England’ (338). If literary cognitivist is right, then 
this is one of the truths we might extract from Austen’s masterpiece. 
However, Stolnitz claims, this statement cannot be cognitively valu-
able, since it doesn’t amount to anything but to the summary of the 
novel, and that is not what literary cognitivist is after. If anything, it is 
the fi ctional truth supported by the text, rather than a ‘worldly’ truth 
supported by the state of the affairs in the world. However, Stolnitz 
misinterprets the function that this proposition, which indeed refers 
to the fi ctional world, can have for the cognitive economy of a reader. 
The problem here is not that the truth extracted from the novel is fi c-
tional; rather, the problem is that it is all together wrongly identifi ed 
as that what the reader should extract from the work. What matters is 
not that a reader reaches the conclusion about two people being kept 
apart by pride and prejudice, but that he comes to understand the role 
that pride and prejudice might have in keeping people apart. Pride 
and prejudice both signal a certain cognitive and moral defi ciency. One 
whose judgments are clouded by prejudice remains blind to how things 
really are, and pride keeps one from refl ecting upon one’s own mistakes 
and sustains one in one’s arrogance. This is what Austen’s novel puts 
to view and becoming aware of the intellectual and ethical malfunc-
tions that spring from pride and prejudice is the lesson we should be 
concerned with in the experience with this work.15
To understand why focusing solely on a principle we might deduct 
from the work is not a good strategy to account for literature’s cogni-
tive value, consider Stolnitz’s second candidate: “Stubborn pride and 
ignorant prejudice keep attractive people apart”. This formulation goes 
beyond the fi ctional setting of the subject level and becomes an abstract 
claim, which Stolnitz fi nds problematic:
Yet in abandoning Hertfordshire in Regency England, we give up the man-
ners and morals that infl uenced the sayings and doings of the hero and 
heroine. (...) Their motivations and behaviour respond to and are thus large-
ly shaped by these other people, fi ctional all, and to each other, of course, 
fi ctional too. (339)
The worry raised here concerns the fact that literary truth we are try-
ing to deduct is necessarily entwined with the fi ctional world: details 
of the fi ctional world give rise to the truth itself. Extracting that truth 
leads us to either offer a summary of the novel (as was the case with 
the fi rst candidate), or to peel down all the fi ctional layers until noth-
15 Goldman (2013) has offered an insightful epistemological reading of Pride and 
Prejudice, claiming that cognitive benefi ts of the novel stem from its showing what 
is involved in a mature moral judgement. E. M. Dadlez ed. (2009) goes even further 
in revealing the novels’ cognitive values, by drawing parallels between Austen’s 
treatment of pride and prejudice and that of David Hume. Both philosophers make 
obvious the cognitive depth of this particular work.
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ing but the bare proposition is left (the second candidate). But in this 
case it is hard to see what gives support to such a bare proposition, and 
how such a bare proposition can be cognitively valuable. If the truth is 
derived from a literary work, it is unsupported by the real world. But 
if it so generalizable as to be independent of the work itself, then, even 
if it has cognitive value, that value cannot be traced back to the work 
itself.16 Seemingly, we have no way of accounting for the intuition that 
we learn certain things from literature and are justifi ed in doing so. 
This dilemma might be effi cient only if we presuppose that the con-
tent of literary works is entirely made up. However, if we presuppose 
that literary writers report what they see in the world, the fact that a 
fi ctional character’s pride keeps her from being happy is not a fact sole-
ly found in literature; it is a statement referring to what people do in 
the real world. Let us not forget that Austen is to this day considered a 
master in realistically capturing details of domestic life and her fi ction 
is repeatedly praised for the true representation of social and economic, 
among other, aspects of her time. Against Stolnitz’s view, the fact that 
the setting and characters are fi ctional does not render her novels si-
lent on how the world is. In fact, “she applies the microscope to human 
character and motivation” which makes her novels unique “as repre-
sentations of universal patterns of behaviour, and as documentation of 
an aspect of the provincial society of her time” (Carter and McRae 1998: 
236). Stolnitz puts a lot of emphasis on the fact that the characters 
and the settings are fi ctional. Consequently, he argues, the ‘lesson’ we 
deduct from reading about their interactions, whichever that is, can-
not be justifi ed on the basis of fi ctional account. However, this argu-
ment only works against the assumption that ‘fi ctional’ equals ‘false’, 
which is not correct. Most literary aestheticians nowadays argue that 
fi ctional is not opposed to factual. It is a pragmatic principle signalling 
the kind of description we are dealing with and the range of activities 
at our disposal with respect to what is described, but it doesn’t imply 
we cannot profi t cognitively from what we read in it.17
3. Normative power and applicability of literary truths
In the previous part I tried to mitigate Stolnitz’s view that there are no 
literary truths, by pointing to empirically-based realistic writing and 
by noting the width of literature as a source of truth. Moreover, I ar-
gued that the method of collecting literary truths is not as effi cient in 
generating cognitive benefi ts as contemplation on the themes present-
ed, and I argued that the fi ctional setting of the novel is not an obstacle 
to its cognitive potential. Stolnitz might concede to my claim, but he 
has a further list of arguments against LC. One such is ‘the problem of 
quantifi cation’:
16 For a similar dilemma, see Lamarque (1996).
17 See Matravers (2014).
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The initial statements refer to Miss Bennet and Mr Darcy, or Ajax and Cre-
on. Do the statements of psychological truth refer to all or most or few of 
the fl esh-and-blood beings they designate? How can we know? The drama 
or novel will not tell us. Praises of its ‘universality’ must do more than beg 
the question or blur it. (339)
The problem of quantifi cation boils down to asking about the referent 
of the truths revealed in the work. Even if there are truths to be gained 
from literature, such as various psychological insights, Stolnitz claims 
that it is hard to understand to whom these truths refer to. Greek trag-
edies’ concern with the question of how hybris infl uences human life, 
argues Stolnitz, does not help us answer whether “hybris must destroy/
may destroy a great man in history [some great men?][all great men?] 
who...” (339).
I want to approach this challenge from two angels. The fi rst one has 
to do with modality of the truths revealed in the literary work: what is 
the normative power of the psychological insight that readers can pick 
up from literary works? If Stolnitz’s analysis of Greek tragedies is cor-
rect and at least one lesson from these tragedies is the ‘hybris affects 
human life’, should we conclude that people must or may become the 
victim of the hybris? Literary cognitivists often point to novels such as 
Ana Karenina and Madam Bovary, claiming that they reveal what is 
like to be in an unhappy marriage. Such novels, cognitivists claim, help 
us understand the psychological motivation that induces one to com-
mit adultery. However, following Stolnitz, we may wonder whether we 
should conclude that being in an unhappy marriage necessarily leads 
to infi delity. The novels tell a certain story, but they do not attach any 
modal value to what they are saying. How is a reader to know?
A second angle from which to approach Stolnitz’s worry concerns 
a distinction some/all: if a tragic hero in a Greek story falls a victim 
of his tragic luck, does it mean that all people/some people/one person 
can experience the same reversal of fortune? If Emma Bovary has no 
other solution for her unhappiness but to pursue sexual relations with 
other men and purchase expensive commodities, does it mean that 
this is true of all unhappily married women? Here we are asking not 
only about the normative power of truths deducted from literature, but 
about their applicability. The experience shows that not all unhappily 
married women engage in adultery and not all people fall victim to bad 
luck. So if truths deducted from literature do not apply to everyone and 
are not universal, whom do they apply to? More signifi cantly, how can 
they be truths, when truths are, by defi nition, universal and objective?
One way to solve this problem is to claim that literary works offer 
hypotheses, rather than truths. On this view, the claim, potentially 
extracted from Madam Bovary, that an unhappily married woman will 
engage in adultery, is a hypothesis about what a woman in a situation 
similar to Emma’s might do, not a statement specifying what she will 
necessarily do. The cognitive value is here tied to the way reader im-
plements this hypothesis into her cognitive repertoire which she uses 
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to make sense of human behaviour. Knowing what sorts of behaviour 
are available expands one’s repertoire of reactions to the world. Un-
derstanding why people act in certain ways enables one to make sense 
of otherwise incomprehensible human behaviour. Here again the cog-
nitive gain is not cashed out propositionally, but rests in literature’s 
showing possible reactions. Rather than focusing on the statement 
which might be deducted from the work (such as Stolnitz’s example 
“His hybris must destroy/may destroy a great man in history [some 
great men?][all great men?] who...”) with the aim of fi nding the referent 
for it, cognitive gain is in considering how a certain ‘lesson’ can inform 
our thought processes on our available options. Tzachi Zamir’s reading 
of King Lear offers illuminative example:
Voices such as Edgar’s and Cordelia’s demonstrate the possibility of forgiv-
ing a parent as well as the incapacity to tell the parent that he is loved. 
Voices such as Racine’s Hyppolytus exhibit the way kindness to a parent 
can be ultimately destructive. All of these are valuable as constituents of 
thought regarding fi lial obligation. All should interplay and constitute ra-
tional moral thinking about relating to a parent. None should simply be 
followed. (Zamir 2006: 41–2).
There is a more straightforward answer to the challenge of normativity 
and applicability. Stolnitz wants to say that, because we don’t know, 
and can’t determine, whether hybris will strike by necessity, whether 
it will strike this or that person, we can’t accept any claim about hy-
bris as a truth. Again by analogy, given that we can’t know if an un-
happy woman will cheat, and which unhappy woman will cheat, we 
can’t take Emma’s adultery as in any way informative on human be-
haviour. However, such arguments rest on a mistaken view about the 
type of content found in literature: unlike scientifi c discourses which 
deal with natural world that is operated by necessity and causality—a 
world which can indeed be described by a set of objective, universally 
valid list of truths—our ‘social’ world (for the lack of a better word) is 
not thus subject to regularities. Consequently, it cannot be so neatly 
described by a list of universally valid statements. Unlike natural sci-
ences, which deal with casual laws, literature deals with the domain of 
human action and interaction, with their sense-making, interpretation 
and values. Some women cheat, but not all, some men are goners but 
some are born under the lucky star. Therefore, some literary works 
describe Emma and some Isabel Archer, some tell the story of Oedipus 
and some of Carrie Meeber.
4. Triviality of literary truths
The problem of quantifi cation does not exhaust all the problems Stol-
nitz attributes to literary cognitivism. The next worry he raises is usu-
ally referred to as the problem of the ‘cognitive familiarity’ and it has 
to do with the fact that literature reveals truths which are already fa-
miliar to the readers, or truths which readers could have come to know 
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through some other means, like their own experience. In commenting 
Adrian Poole’s claim that “Oedipus’ fate opens our eyes to the gaps be-
tween being and doing and understanding”, Stolnitz argues: 
Oedipus certainly acted without understanding and came to realize. So 
have we all, much of the time. It is less certain that those who have read the 
play (...) had not previously learned this truth, at the cost of their own less 
dramatic pain. (340)
A shift is made here from claiming that there are no truths available in 
literature to claiming that what we learn from literature is something 
we have learnt via other means, namely our own experience. Conse-
quently, literature imparts only cognitively trivial truths. If that is so, 
then there is nothing particularly valuable in its handling of humanly 
important issues. However, before we concur with Stolnitz on this, we 
need to be more precise on what is at stake here. The argument from 
cognitive familiarity (CF) can imply four different things, which are 
not always kept apart in discussions. I suggest the following distinc-
tions be made.18 CF can be understood as a claim that (CFi) readers 
already know truths presented in literature, or as a claim that (CFii) 
readers can come to learn truths presented in literature through some 
other means. In a radical version, the argument can also be read as a 
claim that (CFiii) truths which we can gain from literature are well 
known, to the point that they are trivial. Claims (CFi–CFiii) should not 
be confused with the claim (CFiv) according to which readers need to 
bring some knowledge (moral, psychological, emotional) into the read-
ing process in order to get cognitive (moral, psychological, emotional) 
gain after reading.
Many literary cognitivists accept (CFiv). Rather than claiming that 
the ‘lesson’ to be learnt from the Crime and Punishment is the moral 
truth ‘Murder is wrong’, readers already need to know that murder is 
wrong in order to follow the complexities of moral, philosophical and 
psychological situation described by Dostoyevsky. Bringing the knowl-
edge of this principle to the novel enables a reader to engage with Ras-
kolnikov’s refl ections on the morality of crime and psychological impact 
of the knowledge that one has committed it, and consequently, to reach 
a state of deepened understanding of the phenomena described by Dos-
toyevsky. It is because works have this kind of effect on the readers 
that it makes sense to claim that there are indirect cognitive benefi ts 
available from reading. Summarizing (and criticizing) the arguments 
of those who accept this idea, Peter Lamarque refers to it as the cogni-
tive strengthening: “Again the emphasis is away from the acquisition of 
newly found wordly truths towards ‘clarifi cationism’ (Noel Carroll), or 
an ‘enriched understanding’ (Gordon Graham) or an ‘acknowledgment’ 
(John Gibson) of beliefs readers are likely to hold already” (Lamarque 
2010: 381). On Carroll’s view, and similarly with respect to Graham, 
literary works can clarify what is involved in the moral principles, thus 
18 I provided a more detailed account in my 2014.
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enabling readers to gain a fuller understanding of these principles, and 
consequently, to become more sensible towards the ethical demands. 
Gibson relies on Stanley Cavell’s notion of acknowledgment and argues 
that distinctive payoffs of literary works lie in their ability to reveal 
to us requirements that our knowledge makes on us. Knowing some-
thing is not enough, Gibson claims, if one doesn’t understand what this 
knowledge demands of one. I agree with all these versions of cognitive 
strengthening but I will not go into more details here. Suffi ce to say 
that the argument from triviality is surpassed: there is a cognitive gain 
that depends on things readers already know.19 Such a gain is not trivi-
al, since readers do come to deepen their knowledge and understanding 
of notions and principles they are already familiar with.20
What about Stolnitz’s CF argument developed along claims i–iii 
above? An easy way out of the problem for those who want to save 
the overall aesthetic value of works that (supposedly) present trivial 
truths is to claim that the value of a work resides not in new cognitive 
contributions, i.e. truths, but in the way these truths are developed (see 
Lamarque 2010: 239). From the point of view of literary aesthetics, this 
is a welcome solution which saves the value of literature that might 
have been lost. But from the epistemological point of view, this is not 
enough. Literary cognitivist wants to show that literature is a cogni-
tively valuable source of knowledge, not cognitively trivial but aestheti-
cally pleasing archive of things we already know. Therefore, we have 
to refute Stolnitz. We’ll start with (CFi): readers already know truths 
presented in literature.
Certainly it is true that in some cases—perhaps many—what we 
read in a literary work is known to us. That people commit murders 
because they are in need of money, that women and men engage in 
adultery because they are unhappy and dissatisfi ed with their part-
ners or are simply bored and in need of excitement, that abortion was 
not always legal in America—these truths we know without reading 
Crime and Punishment, Madam Bovary and An American Tragedy, re-
spectively. But to presuppose, as Stolnitz does, that such bare truth 
is all that we get from these works is a seriously impoverished way 
19 One way in which to bolster the cognitive strengthening line of defence 
is provided by those who defend the analogy between literature and thought 
experiment. As David Davies explains „the mental models through which readers 
comprehend fi ctional narratives also provide, through their mobilization of tacit or 
unarticulated knowledge of the world, a means of testing those claims to knowledge 
of the actual world that theorists have located in fi ctional narratives, and thereby 
validate the idea that fi ction can be a genuine source of knowledge of the world” 
(Davies 2007: 44).
20 A much stronger claim for the value of cognitive strengthening can be made if 
one relies on the recent developments in epistemology concerning the plurality view 
of epistemic aims and values. Wayne Riggs (2008) and Jonathan Kvanvig (2005) are 
some of the authors who developed accounts of understanding, and Linda Zagzebski 
(2001) and Catherine Elgin (1996) have both wrote on the connection between 
literature and understanding. I offer one such account in Vidmar (2013).
 I. Vidmar, Literature and Truth: Revisiting Stolnitz’s Anti-cognitivism 363
to think about their overall cognitive value. Crime and Punishment 
offers more than simple statements regarding the wrongness of mur-
der. Many critics read it as a philosophical analysis of the principle 
of consequentialism and utilitarianism, as a psychological analysis of 
the impact of guilt and passivity upon an individual, as a sociological 
study of the poverty and alcoholism that were so widely spread in the 
city in that period.21 At one level, there are various philosophical, psy-
chological and sociological truths available in this novel and it makes 
no sense to suppose that readers know all of them before they begin 
to read. On the other hand, development of the story along these lines 
can contribute substantially to how reader thinks about justifi ability of 
murder. A reader might come to realize that she would act in the same 
way in those circumstances, or she might conclude that the principle 
‘Do not kill’ applies universally and is not liable to consequentialist’s 
treatment. While it cannot be predicted what someone will get out of 
the work, there are important cognitive gains available, ranging from 
self knowledge to a deepened understanding of the moral principle.
To claim that literature presents only those things that readers 
already know seriously undermines some of the intentions authors 
might have had in presenting the story in a particular way. It is a well 
documented fact that Dreiser was passionately interested in human 
sexuality and was eager to understand social forces related to distri-
bution of wealth (see Eby 2005). All of his novels are, thematically, 
about these issues. Committed to realism, he was particularly atten-
tive to objectively and non-selectively depicting and portraying aspects 
of social reality. For the sake of argument, let us agree with the claim 
that his contemporaries were familiar with all the things he was writ-
ing about:22 development and operation of big factories, entertainment 
industry, art scene and fi nances etc. Does it mean that therefore his 
works lack cognitive value? Certainly not, primarily because his inten-
tion was not to tell them what they already know but to challenge them 
to reconsider social and psychological forces that went into creating 
the reality he was describing. For all of his realism, Dreiser persist-
ently used his literary works as an epistemological tool for probing the 
conditions of humans. Take the abortion episode from An American 
Tragedy: Dreiser is reporting what the readers (his contemporaries) 
knew—abortion is illegal—but he is relying on this knowledge in order, 
fi rst, to theoretically discuss human sexuality, and second, to critically 
examine social circumstances involved in condemnation of abortion. 
Carefully addressing the issue of sexuality, he is examining the power 
of sexual urges in humans. By exposing society’s attitudes toward preg-
nancies outside of marriage, he is criticizing the fact that the moral 
judgment regarding the ‘sinful’ as opposed to ‘forgiveness-worthy’ is de-
21 For the interpretation along these lines see Dilman (1968), Ivanits (2008).
22 But note that for readers who are not his contemporaries, his books offer a 
historical window into the development of great American cities.
364 I. Vidmar, Literature and Truth: Revisiting Stolnitz’s Anti-cognitivism
termined by one’s social status, rather than by some intrinsic features 
of the sexual deed itself. Given their poor background, Cylde and Rob-
erta are two sinners who committed a “dreadful crime”. On the other 
hand, “unfortunate” girls from rich families deserve to be rescued and 
resolved of their ‘mistakes’, not ‘crimes’. Thus, “the real sex crime that 
Dreiser exposes in An American Tragedy is the national criminaliza-
tion of sexuality” (Eby 2005: 582). By depicting the familiar situation, 
Dreiser criticizes the society and its hypocrisy, evident in the way it 
tries to control and sanction biological impulses: Roberta’s shame and 
guilt caused by her (physical) desire for Clyde is the voice of society 
and upbringing; the inability to suppress these desires is the biological 
force which ultimately takes over.
The slave narratives and colonial literature are other interesting 
examples of literary works which depict phenomena that are common 
knowledge, but offer a wider, more personal perspectives into these 
matters. A Passage to India, Heart of Darkness, Beloved and many 
other works depict issues of race, racism and racial superiority and 
present it from the experiential perspective of those who were directly 
involved in these processes. Unlike historical accounts which give fac-
tual descriptions of how these processes were conducted, literary works 
reveal subjective experience and challenge the underlying assumptions 
that scientifi c accounts do not raise.
Moving on to (CFii): readers can come to learn truths presented 
in literature through some other means, such as personal experience, 
testimony or science and therefore, literature is not in any special way 
cognitively valuable. However, many, if not most, of the things we 
know are easily available through some other means. If I know there’s 
no milk in the fridge, I could have come to that truth through percep-
tion (I opened the fridge and saw there’s no milk), through testimony 
(my sister told me), through memory (I remember using the last bottle 
of milk), through deduction (I remember buying milk fi ve days ago and 
that’s how long it takes me to use one bottle) etc. That however doesn’t 
mean the truth about not having milk is any less valuable. For my per-
spective here—epistemological—the fact that literature is not the sole 
source of truths does not mean that its cognitive value is diminished.
Replies to (CFi) and (CFii) should by now make it clear that (CFi-
ii), the most radical reading of the argument from cognitive familiarity 
according to which truths which we can gain from literature are well 
known, to the point that they are trivial, is also to be dismissed along 
the same lines as (CFi). Literature is cognitively valuable and the cogni-
tive benefi ts it delivers are many, important, and quite possibly in some 
cases at least, not easily obtainable through other means. For the (CFiii) 
to have any power, Stolnitz would have to show that everything that can 
be known through literary works is already known by all the potential 
readers. He would also have to show that no value is derived from depict-
ing that which is known. I doubt such an argument would be convincing.
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5. Literature as a social practice
Stolnitz’s fi nal list of arguments aims at undermining epistemic reli-
ability of literature as a practice. When it comes to literature, he argues, 
there are no established ways of spotting mistakes, solving contradic-
tions and confi rming truths. The underlying structure of literature does 
not correspond to that of our established cognitive practices. In science 
and religion, his go-to examples of such practices, truths are supported, 
mistakes eliminated and contradictions resolved, by the underlying 
body of evidence.23 No such mechanisms exist in art: “Art, uniquely, nev-
er confi rms its truths” (340) Stolnitz claims, adding “The fi ction does not 
and cannot provide the evidence” (340). In addition, even if art reveals 
truth—such as that “Estate litigation in the Court of Chancery in mid-
nineteenth England moved very slowly” (340) from Dickens’ novel—“the 
truth was knowable before the fi ctions appeared” (341).
At stake here is the fact that literature seems exempt from epistem-
ic norms defi nitive of informative discourses.24 Literary works deliver 
contradictory views—look no further than Uncle Tom’s Cabin and Gone 
with the Wind—and contain factual mistakes that go uncorrected, such 
as mesmerism in Bronte sisters and physiognomy in Dickens. However, 
such factual mistakes do not deter readers from these works, nor dimin-
ish their value. Today we know that physiognomy is wrong, but we nev-
ertheless enjoy Dickens’ novels. But for literature to be cognitively valu-
able, argues Stolnitz, either should such mistakes should be corrected, or 
value of such works anihilated. Given that this is not the practice, as we 
neither allow intrusions into literary works nor deny them their value, 
we should give up advocating cognitive value of literature altogether.
All things considered, Stolnitz makes a good point in preaching cau-
tion: art and literature do not satisfy epistemic conditions of reliability 
we presuppose in and demand of science and other discourses imbued 
with cognitive potential. To overcome this problem, we fi rst need to 
show that mistakes and contradictions found in literature do not un-
dermine its claims to cognitive value. Elsewhere I have provided one 
such account and here I can only briefl y repeat my conclusions (Vidmar 
2012a). My main point was that not all mistakes found in literature re-
sult from ignorance or deliberate intention on the part of the author to 
deceive or convey falsehood—factors, in other words, that count against 
one’s reliability. Some mistakes, such as those resulting from an au-
thor’s reliance on physiognomy, were, at the time the work was written, 
not mistaken, but scientifi cally accepted theories about human nature. 
If anything, such cases prove the extent to which literary authors rely 
on scientifi c theories in their works, presupposing that these are true 
given that they are accepted by the scientifi c community. In such cases, 
23 It is questionable to which extent it is acceptable to talk of truth and lack of 
contradictions in religion. But to make the argument plausible, suffi ce to say that 
there are authorities, such as the Pope, who can be solve contradictions.
24 See Stein Haugom Olsen (1978) for a discussion of informative discourses.
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mistakes are the result of a background beliefs that the authors rely 
upon, beliefs that were, at the time of writing, accepted scientifi c truths 
about how things are. Such mistakes are epistemically important in the 
sense that they testify to how things were once conceived. Literature 
thus testifi es to the progression and accumulation of the overall human 
knowledge. It is progressive and it accumulates knowledge from vari-
ous disciplines. It refl ects views and perspectives of the society. There-
fore, as the scientifi c, religious, psychological, sociological, philosophical 
etc. views progress and modify, so does the way these are incorporated 
into literature. That is why there are mistakes, as well as contradictory 
views, in literature. They do not diminish the value of a work (neither 
cognitive nor literary) because there are other elements that bear upon 
work’s cognitive impact and artistic value, elements which are not op-
erative in scientifi c discourse. While scientifi c works become obsolete 
if the theories are wrong, literary works hold our attention because of 
the way the theme is developed, because of their formal features, emo-
tional impact, aesthetic appeal and other artistic reasons. Very often, 
mistakes do not render works cognitively impotent. The fact that Ib-
sen develops the story of Ghosts on a scientifi cally mistaken account of 
syphilis (Olsen’s example) does not render his psychological portrayal 
of dysfunctional family and broken family ties any less illuminating. 
Indirect cognitive benefi ts are still available, even if facts are wrong.
My account so far explains why sometimes mistakes are in litera-
ture, but Stolnitz’s claim regarding the lack of epistemic principles is 
still on the table. However, his criticism is too strong. Even if the prac-
tice of literature does not rest on established methods of spotting mis-
takes and correcting them, it is not so that ‘anything goes.’ Recall that I 
have in mind an active, refl ective reader whose knowledge of the world 
and literature is suffi cient to provide a sort of a safety net. His experi-
ence enables him to differentiate between authors who present reliable 
accounts in their works and those who do not. One important element 
that readers rely on is familiarity with the demands of different genres. 
Depending on the genre in which they write, literary authors are to 
various degrees concerned with objective portrayal of reality, and when 
it comes to those genres in which aesthetic norms demand that they 
turn away from reality, readers do not expect these works to represent 
reality. It would be implausible to talk about mistakes in science fi ction 
novels, even if it is perfectly acceptable to evaluate one’s vision, say 
futuristic, with the state of affairs a novel describes.25 Here again the 
analogy with testimony is informative: an evaluation of the reliability 
of a literary author is similar to the evaluation of our everyday infor-
mants, with the additional element of knowledge of the conventions 
of literary genres and an awareness (even superfi cial) of the literary 
techniques that might be used to support artistic aims.
25 For an example of how to evaluate a science fi ction writer with respect to the 
correctness of his portrayal, see Vidmar and Swirski (2014).
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A further worry that Stolnitz raises is the fact that truths were 
knowable before they appeared in a certain work. This implies that 
they do not gain their authority in the same way as scientifi c truths do: 
many, perhaps all, scientifi c truths were not known until they appeared 
in scientifi c work. This is not so with literature. However, even if litera-
ture does not generate truths in the same way as science does (i.e. being 
part of a fi ctional discourse does not give them authority, whereas be-
ing a part of scientifi c discourse does), that doesn’t mean that the value 
and validity of such truths is lost. Literature is still a valuable source 
of truths even if it doesn’t discover them, but only delivers them. While 
it is true that Dickens’ readers knew that legal system of their time 
was slow, just like Dreiser’s readers were familiar with development of 
factories, for us, today, these works give us new, unknown information 
about social, political, economic and other circumstances dominant at 
the time these works were written. As evident from my reply to instanc-
es of CF argument, literature doesn’t have to be dedicated to discovering 
truths in a way that science is to be cognitively valuable.
Finally, Stolnitz reverberates some of the concerns raised by Plato 
regarding the epistemic authority of authors. As he claims, truths de-
rived from art “do not require specialists” (342). I take this to be the 
most pressing issue. How to account for the incredibly sharp insight 
into human psychology that imbues Shakespeare, Hawthorne, Austen, 
Dostoyevsky and various others literary classics? Most of the literary 
giants wrote their works at incredibly young age, and not all of them 
had a fi rst class education. What made them so great at capturing the 
world in all of its complexities? I doubt we can fi nd any theoretical an-
swer to this, and it might be so that we need a case by case study. To 
many, observation was crucial. Dostoyevsky claimed it was the years 
he spent in Siberian prison that made him sensitive to the nuances of 
human psychology. Edith Wharton, Theodore Dreiser, Leo Tolstoy and 
many other realists were relying on empirical methods of observation 
and description. Writers were often a part of wider group of intellectu-
als, all of which were devoted to pursuing different kinds of knowl-
edge; arguably, they relied on others for insights into different areas 
of research and used that knowledge in their works. In modern days, 
writers do research and consult experts, as often revealed in their in-
terviews. Whether that suffi ces to answer Stolnitz I do not know, but I 
am not sure if epistemology can offer anything better.
One fi nal observation: in his haste to expel literature from the do-
main of informative practices, due to its apparent inability to hold 
hands with the sciences, Stolnitz does not consider the possibility that 
literature would fare much better if compared to a different set of cog-
nitively valuable practices: the humanities. Many of his arguments 
against taking literature cognitively seriously apply to philosophy. Phi-
losophy too contains contradictions, as when Kant clashes his theory of 
causality against Hume’s, and mistakes, as when Descartes explains 
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human emotional experience via the notion of animal spirits. Occasion-
ally, it is questionable which truths are philosophical and how to de-
termine them, as philosophy lacks a universally accepted method and 
shares its concerns with sciences and the humanities. Nevertheless, 
we repeatedly recognize it as cognitively valuable. Furthermore, litera-
ture and philosophy are in the same manner concerned with humanly 
important issues, and with challenging what is known and familiar. 
Stressing the similarities literature shares with philosophy is impor-
tant for the overall assessment of its cognitive value.
6. Conclusion
My aim in this paper was to provide an epistemological account of the 
cognitive value of literature that can mitigate, if not fi ght off, Stolnitz’s 
arguments. While it is my impression that Stolnitz challenges litera-
ture on an overly simplifi ed assumption about the veritistic nature of 
sciences, my aim here was to show that his challenges can be met. 
Literature does not satisfy scientifi c criteria of discovering truth, but 
these are not the only criteria relevant for knowledge and learning and 
neither is scientifi c way the only way in which we can gain knowledge. 
Divorcing literature from the norms of science does not imply divorcing 
it from norms of epistemic reliability or making it incapable of deliv-
ering knowledge and being cognitively valuable. Confi rmation of the 
truths extracted from literature comes from life and experience. The 
great works of art that give incentive to our cognitive pursuits may be 
unrelated but to the extent that they are concerned with human situa-
tion in the world and humanly important issues, they form a corpus of 
different ways of being human and acting (in)humanly, in the widest 
sense possible. Formal contradictions are tolerated not because litera-
ture is above the norms of epistemic reliability bur because it refl ects 
advances in ideas and conceptions and their diversity. There are no 
easy, straightforward answers to questions that literature raises, be-
cause there are no easy and simple answers to questions that concern 
humanity itself. Finally, there is more to our cognitive economy than 
having true propositions and literary works offer potential for genuine 
advance in one’s conceptual framework. Understanding other people’s 
experiences, having an awareness of what it feels like to be in a certain 
situation, having one’s views challenged and getting the opportunity 
for a refl ection, re-examination and re-evaluation of one’s body of be-
liefs matters signifi cantly for how we are as epistemic agents. None of 
these benefi ts is available on Stolnitz’s over-simplistic account of what 
comprises cognitive value.26
26 This work has been fully supported by the University of Rijeka under the 
project number 17.05.2.2.05 entitled Literature as Domain of Ethics. The author 
expresses her gratitude for this support. Thanx also go to all the participants of 
Philosophy of Art conference in Dubrovnik.
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